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MAY-JUNE, 1958
TEN YEARS OF SHELLEY v. KRAEMER
By BENJAMIN L. CRAIG
Benjamin L. Craig received his B.S. in Busi-
ness Administration from Montana State
University in 1953. He is a student at the
University of Denver College of Law.
THE DOCTRINE
In May 1948, the United States Supreme Court handed down its
decision in Shelley v. Kraemer,' reversing the Missouri Supreme Court
holding which had sustained the right to enforce by injunction private
racially restrictive covenants relative to real property. The Court held
that such judicial enforcement violated the equal protection provision
of the fourteenth amendment.! At the same time the Court, in Hurd v.
Hodge' held that judicial enforcement of racially restrictive covenants
by the District of Columbia courts is prohibited by the Federal Civil
Rights Act.' The Court went further:
"It is not consistent with the public policy of the United
States to permit federal courts in the Nation's capital to exercise
general equitable powers to compel action denied the state
courts where such action has been held violative of the guarantee
of equal protection of the laws."5
These cases were hailed as landmark cases in constitutional law.
Prior to 1948, it generally had been held that such private restrictions
could be judicially enforced. The Supreme Court's decision in Corrigan
v. Buckley' contributed to this view. In that case the Court had held
that since the suit was brought in the District of Columbia, it could
present no issues under the fourteenth amendment and that the ques-
tion of the validity of judicial enforcement of the restrictive covenant
1334 U.S. 1, (1948).2 U.S. Const. Amend. XIV, § 1 provides: "No state shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States;
nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
3 334 U.S. 24, (1948).
4 8 U.S.C.A. § 42.
5 Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24, 35 (1948) (dictum).
6 271 U.S. 323 (1926).
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under the fifth amendment was not properly before the Court. The
only issue presented was the validity of the covenant as such. The Court
concluded that since the constitutional provisions invoked only inhib-
ited government action, there was no showing that the private agree-
ments were invalid.' The Court in the Shelley case distinguished Corri-
gan v. Buckley on the ground that, in the latter, there was no direct ad-
judication on the precise constitutional issue of judicial enforcement.
Although the Court in the Shelley case held that judicial enforce-
ment of these private agreements was repugnant to the fourteenth
amendment, it did not hold that the agreements themselves were void.
(the fourteenth) Amendment erects no shield against
merely private conduct, however discriminatory or wrongful.
"We conclude, therefore, that restrictive agreements stand-
ing alone cannot be regarded as violative of any rights guaran-
teed to petitioners by the Fourteenth Amendment."'
Judicial action has always been regarded as action of the state
within the meaning of the fourteenth amendment. The Shelley case
cites and quotes from prior rulings of the Court.
"The federal guarantee of due process extends to state
action through its judicial as well as through its legislative,
executive or administrative branch of government."'
The precise holding of the Shelley case was that judicial action in
granting injunctions to enforce racially restrictive real property cove-
nants was state action inconsistent with the equal protection provision
of the fourteenth amendment. The broader doctrine implied in the
holding is that any judicial enforcement of discriminatory private agree-
ments would also be state action in violation of the fourteenth amend-
ment. Writers have predicted that this broad doctrine would be ap-
plied to any case involving judicial enforcement, either directly or in-
directly through refusal to act, of a discriminatory real property agree-
ment. They have predicted further that any attempt to effect racial
discrimination by the use of devices other than real property covenants
would fall before the impact of the doctrine."
The purpose of this note is to discuss the cases subsequent to Shelley
7 See analysis of the Corrigan case in Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 8 (1948).
s 334 U.S. at 13 (parenthetical matter added).
9 Id. at 15 (quoting with approval from Brinkerhoff-Faris Trust and Sav. Co. v.
Hill, 281 U.S. 673. 680).
10 Scanlon, Racial Restrictions in Real Estate, 24 Notre Dame Law 157, 177-89
(1949). Notes: 13 U. of Pitt. L. Rev. 647 (1952); 37 Calif. L. Rev. 493 (1949): 29 Rocky
Mtn. L. Rev. 223, 226-31 (1957).
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v. Kraemer and determine what effect that decision has had on this
area of the law during the last decade.
.JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF THE DOCTRINE
In cases involving equitable action to enforce racially restrictive
covenants, the courts have generally followed the Shelley doctrine with-
out question." The unenforceable covenant, however, has perplexed
the courts. A number of questions have been raised involving the status
of such covenants.
ACTIONS FOR DAMAGES
On the question of whether an action for damages can be maintained
there have been several judicial pronouncements. The Missouri court
in Weiss v. Leon" held that such an action could be maintained. In that
case the plaintiff had asked for specific enforcement and damages. The
trial court dismissed the entire action but the Missouri Supreme Court
thought that the count for damages should stand. The court interpreted
the Shelley case as prohibiting judicial action only in the form of equit-
able relief. The Oklahoma court has reached the same result on the
theory of a conspiracy grounded in tort to damage the plaintiff by re-
ducing the value of his property."
A different result was reached in two other jurisdictions. The
district court for the District of Columbia held that while the Shelley
case dealt with equitable relief, its ruling was broad enough to cover
an action for damages." The court said: "I construe the ruling of the
Supreme Court as withholding any assistance by way of judicial action
of any kind from enforcement of such restrictive covenants."'" In Phillips
v. Naff" the Michigan court held that such suits for damages were indi-
rect methods of enforcement which constituted an action in violation
of :the fourteenth amendment.
The question was finally settled by the United States Supreme
Court in Barrows v. Jackson." There the Court held that the four-
teenth amendment prohibits state action in the form of awarding dam-
ages since this would have the effect of a sanction by the state and would
encourage the use of restrictive covenants. The Court reasoned that:
"If the State may thus punish respondent for her failure to
carry out her covenant, she is coerced to continue to use her
property in a discriminatory manner, which in essence is the
purpose of the covenant. Thus, it becomes not respondent's
voluntary choice but the State's choice that she observe her
covenant or suffer damages. The action of a state court at law
to sanction the validity of the restrictive covenant here involved
11 Coleman v. Stewart, 33 Cal. 2d 703, 204 P.2d 7 (1949); Cummings v. Hokr, 31 Cal.
2d 844, 193 P.2d 742 (1948) ; Tovey v. Levy, 401, Ill. 393, 82 N.E.2d 441 (1948); Rich v.
Jones, 142 N.J. Eq. 215, 59 A.2d 839 (1948); Goetz v. Smith, 191 Md. 707, 62 A.2d 602
(1948); Malicke v. Milan, 320, Mich. 65, 32 N.W.2d 353 (1948); Woytus v. Winkler, 357
Mo. 1082, 212 S.W.2d 411 (1948); Kemp v. Rubin, 298 N.Y. 590, 81 N.E.2d 325 (1948);
Earley v. Baughman, 200 Okla. 649, 199 P.2d 210 (1948).
12 359 Mo. 1054, 225 S.W.2d 127 (1949).
1a Correll v. Earley, 205 Okla. 366, 237 P.2d 1017 (1951).
'4 Roberts v. Curtis, 93 F. Supp. 604 (D.D.C. 1950).
15 Id. at 604.
16 232 Mich. 389, 52 N.W.2d 158 (1952).
17 346 U.S. 249 (1953).
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would constitute state action as surely as it was state action to
enforce such covenants in equity, as in Shelley supra." "
The result is that courts may not enforce racially restrictive cove-
nants either in equity or at law by an action for damages. This is in
line with the broad declaration in the Shelley case that state action,
whatever the form, denying to certain persons because of race, creed,
or color the rights enjoyed by others, violates the fourteenth amend-
ment.
RESTRICTIVE COVENANT AS DEFENSE IN CONTRACT ACTION
The question of whether a discriminatory covenant can be relied on
as a defense to an action on contract is not so clearly settled. In Rice v.
Sioux City Memorial Park Cemeteiy," the plaintiff brought an action
for damages against the cemetery for its refusal to perform a contract
to bury her Indian husband. The defendant sought to escape liability
by standing on a covenant in the contract which restricted burial privi-
leges to Caucasians. The Iowa trial court ruled that the covenant was
not void but merely unenforceable. However, the court ruled that it
could be employed as a defense to an action on the contract; and that
the court's action in permitting this defense was not state action in
violation of the fourteenth amendment." The Supreme Court of Iowa
affirmed, reasoning that Shelley v. Kraemer did not require enforcement
of the contract without regard to the covenant. "It is clear that state
action . . . has only been expanded to direct action . . . to aid in the
enforcement of restrictive or discriminating acts or agreements.""
The court felt that such direct acts were not presented where the state
maintained neutrality.
This would seem to be contrary to Barrows v. Jackson, where the
Supreme Court held that indirect aids employed to enforce such a cove-
nant deny equal protection just as clearly as does specific performance.'
After affirming the decision of the Iowa Supreme Court in a per curiam
opinion by an equally divided court, " the United States Supreme Court
vacated this judgment and dismissed the writ of certiorari as improvi-
dently granted.' Strictly speaking, this decision had the effect of leaving
the question open.
COVENANTS AS A BASIS FOR RESCISSION
There have been some attempts to use the unenforceable covenant as
i8 Id. at 254.
19 245 Iowa 147, 60 NAV.%d 110 (1953), aff'd, per curiam, without opinion by an
equally divided court, 348 U.S. 880 (1954). On rehearing, judgment vacated and writ
of certiorari dismissed, 349 U.S. 70 (1955).
20 Rice v. Sioux City Memorial Park Cemetery, 245 Iowa 147, 60 N.W.2d 110, 116
(1953).
21 Id. at 116.
22 See Clifton v. Puente. 218 S.W.2d 272, 274 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948): "It is as much
an enforcement of the covenant to deny a person a legal right to which he would be
entitled except for the covenant as would be to expressly command by judicial order
that the terms of the covenant be exercised and carried out."
23 Rice v. Sioux City Memorial Park Cemetery, 348 U.S. 880 (1954).
24 Rice v. Sioux City Miemorial Park Cemetery, 349 U.S. 70 (1955). It was brought
out on rehearing that Iowa had passed a statute after the commencement of the
action which prohibited cemeteries from denying burial on the basis of race or color.
This statute had the effect of making the case one of isolated significance and not a
case for certiorari as prescribed by Supreme Court Rule 19.
SACHS-LAWLOR- CORPORATIOn SEALS. LPInE 5-3422
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a basis for rescinding a contract. For example, a District of Columbia
court allowed a Negro purchaser to rescind his contract and recover his
deposit upon learning that the property was subject to an "unenforce-
able" restrictive covenant.25 The court reasoned that the presence of the
covenant was a source of possible litigation even though the purchaser
was assured of its unenforceability. When the contract was made, prior
to Hurd v. Hodge, the covenant was considered enforceable and the seller
owed the purchaser a duty of disclosure. Failure to disclose amounted to
a material misrepresentation even though the covenant was later de-
clared "unenforceable." As pointed out by the court, there is a difference
between this case and those in which the seller has disclosed the exis-
tence of the covenant and the buyer has signed the contract with that
knowledge. Thus in Meckler v. Baugh,0 the buyer contracted with full
knowledge. Later, on the theory that the contract was void, he refused
to perform and brought an action to recover his deposit. The Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia, in a per curiam opinion, affirmed
the lower court's decision denying his right to recover.
DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS AS TO THE VALIDITY OF THE COVENANT
BETWEEN THE PARTIES
Here again the unenforceable covenant caused difficulty. In Clare-
mont Improvement Club v. Buckingham," the California Supreme Court
reversed the judgment of the lower court and refused to render a declar-
atory judgment on the validity of the covenant since racially restrictive
covenants are unenforceable by judicial process and a declaratory judg-
ment would not simplify matters.
The North Carolina Supreme Court reached a different result in
Charlotte Park and Recreation Commission v. Barringer.8 There the
defendant conveyed the land to the plaintiff for city recreational pur-
poses, providing that if the land should be used by persons of the Negro
race, it would revert back to the grantor. After a request by Negroes to
use a golf course on the land, plaintiff asked for a declaratory judgment
to determine its rights. The trial court granted this request. The Su-
preme Court affirmed, reasoning that where land automatically reverts
to the grantor upon the happening of a condition, a declaratory judg-
ment is only a recognition of a legal fact which occurred without any
action on the part of the state and therefore did not violate the fourteenth
amendment."
The Colorado court in a declaratory judgment action apparently has
adopted the doctrine of Shelley v. Kraemer in its broadest form. In
Capitol Federal Savings and Loan Assn. v. Smith,"0 the court affirmed
a decree quieting title in the plaintiff, a Negro purchaser, and declar-
ing that a restrictive covenant was unenforceable as a matter of law.
25 Cohn v. Trawick, 60 A.2d 926 (D.C. Munic. App. 1948). Accord, Savage v. Parks,
100 A.2d 450 (D.C. Munic. App. 1953).
26 168 F.2d 574 (D.C. Cir. 1948).
27 89 Cal. App. 2d 32, 200 P.2d 47 (1948).
28 242 N.C. 311, 88 S.E.2d 114 (1955). cert. den., 350 U.S. 983 (1956).
29 Contra, Clifton v. Puente, 218 S.W.2d 272 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948). The grantor in
a deed provided that the land should not be sold to persons of Mexican descent and
that in the event of any violation thereof, all title to the then owner and occupant
should be forfeited to the grantor. The court did not decide whether this was a
determinable fee or a right of re-entry on condition subsequent but decided that to
enforce it would be stpte action in violation of the fourteenth amendment.
30 316 P.2d 252 (1957).
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The agreement in this case was that the lots owned by the plaintiff's pred-
ecessors in title and other property owners in the some block should not
be sold or leased to colored persons. It further provided for forfeiture,
in case the agreement was violated, to such of the then owners in the
block who should place notice of their claims of record. The supreme
court, through Mr. Justice Knauss, stated:
"No matter by what ariose terms the covenant under con-
sideration may be classified by astute counsel, it is still a racial
restriction in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Federal Constitution .... High sounding phrases or outmoded
common law terms cannot alter the effect of the agreement em-
braced in the instant case.
"Because the United States Supreme Court has extracted
any teeth which such covenant was supposed to have, no rights,
duties or obligations can be based thereon." (emphasis added) "
The court thus indicates there is no device-provision for forfeiture,
reverter or otherwise-by which a restrictive agreement might be legally
enforced. It treats the covenant as literally unenforceable, and refuses to
recognize it as a basis for any action, recognizing that any such action
would be in violation of the fourteenth amendment.
POSSIBLE EXTENSION or THE DOCTRINE
Can Shelley v. Kraemer be extended beyond the realm of judicial
action to executive and administrative action? Some language in the case
would seem to support such an extension."
The United States Supreme Court, in a recent decision, found that
state action in violation of the fourteenth amendment had been exer-
cised by the Board of Directors of City Trusts of the City of Phila
delphia."
Stephen Girard by a will probated in 1831, left in trust a fund for
the establishment of a college for "poor white male orphans," naming as
31 Id. at 255.
32 See quotation from Brinkerhoff-Faris Trust and Say. Co. v. Hill, 271 U.S.
673, 680 (1930), in Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. at 15.
33 Pennsylvania v. Board of Directors of City Trusts, 353 U.S. 230 (1947), rehearing
den., 353 U.S. 989 (1957).
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trustee the City of Philadelphia.' In City of Philadelphia v. Fox" it was
held that the city could act as trustee, and that an act of the state legisla-
ture," providing for administration by a Board of Directors of City
Trusts, was a valid enactment since the Board was "disassociated from
the general government of the city.""
In 1954 two boys who applied for admission to the college were re-
fused by the Board because they were Negroes. They then petitioned
the Orphans Court for an order directing the Board to admit them.
The order was refused and they appealed to the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court which affirmed the judgment of the Orphan's Court. The United
States Supreme Court then granted certiorari. The Court, in a per curiam
opinion held that the Board was an agency of the State of Pennsylvania.
Therefore, its refusal to admit Negroes because of their race was dis-
crimination, in violation of the fourteenth amendment, even though it
was acting as a trustee. "
This holding seems to be in line with the statement in Shelley v.
Kraemer that "State action, as that phrase is understood for the purposes
of the Fourteenth Amendment, refers to exertions of state power in all
its forms."'"
CONCLUSION
The court in the Girard case found state action in the acts of the
trustee, but might it not go further and find state action in the judicial
determination of whether the trust is charitable, in construing ambigious
language, probating the will, or in legislation creating and defining char-
itable trusts, regulating the trustees, and bestowing tax immunity?" If,
as suggested by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania," a private trustee
of the Girard trust is substituted for the present trustee and the case
should again come up for review, the United States Supreme Court
might .well be confronted with this issue. This issue was presented in
argument before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court along with the issue
34 Pennsylvania v. Board of Directors, supra note 33.
35 64 Pa. 169 (1870).
36 Act of June 30, 1869, P.L. 1276, 53 P.S. §§ 6481-6486.
37 In re Girard's Estate, 386 Pa. 548, 127 A.2d 287 (1956), rev'd per curiam, 353 U.S.
230 (1957), rehearing den., 353 U.S. 989 (1957).
38 4 D. & C.2d 671. (Orph. Ct. Philadelphia).
39 Pennsylvania v. Board of Directors of City Trusts, 353 U.S. 230 (1957).
40 334 U.S. at 20.
4' Charitable Trusts, 66 Yale L.J. 979. See also, Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 at
22: "And it would appear beyond question that the power of the State to create and
enforce property interests must be exercised within the boundaries defined by the
Fourteenth Amendment." Contra, Dorsey v. Stuyvesant Town Corp., 299 N.Y. 512, 87
N. E.2d 541 (1949). Stuyvesant town was built pursuant to a contract between the
City of New York and Stuyvesant Town Corp., a subsidiary of Metropolitan Life
Insurance Co., organized as a redevelopment company under the New York re-
development companies law. This law provides that the municipality may take
property by condemnation for a redevelopment company and may exempt the
company from local and municipal taxes. The contract in this case included these
benefits. Negro plaintiffs were refused apartments in the finished project because of
their color and sued to enjoin such discrimination. It was held that the aids that the
state provided the defendants and the controls that they were subject to were not
sufficient to transform their conduct into state action violating the fourteenth
amendment. This was merely private action which was recognized as valid in Shelley
v. Kraemer. Three judges dissented.
42 In re Girard's E]state, 386 Ps. 548, 127 A.2d 287, 295 (1956) (concurring opinion).
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of state action by the trustee.'3 It was emphasized in a concurring
opinion. The author-recognizing that the fourteenth amendment pro-
hibits discrimination because of race, creed, or color-was fearful that
such an extension of the state action concept would have a catastrophic
effect on testamentary church and charitable bequests." Although the
guarantee of freedom to worship under the first amendment would
probably temper the effects of the author's fears, his opinion points out
the possible extremes to which such a rule could extend."'
What will be the effect of the Girard case on other similar charitable
trusts? For example, look at the Clayton College trust. The history of
this trust parallels that of the Girard trust. The will of George W. Clay-
ton reads:
"I do hereby give, devise and bequeath, unto the Corpora-
tion of the City of Denver, in trust never-the-less, to be devoted
solely and exclusively to the founding, establishing and forever
maintaining a permanent college within the City of Denver, in
the County of Arapahoe and State of Colorado, for the better
education, and more comfortable maintenance than they usually
receive from the application of public funds, of poor, white male
orphan children, somewhat on the plan of Girard College, in
the City of Philadelphia and State of Pennsylvania .. .""
Legislation was enacted specifically authorizing the city to act as a trus-
tee and Ordinance No. 110, Series of 1910, City and County of Denver set
up the George W. Clayton Trust Commission. The Colorado Supreme
Court has referred to the George W. Clayton Trust Commission as the
proper and appropriate "agency of the municipality" in charge of the
trust estate." These facts would seem to put the Clayton Trust well
within the decision of the United States Supreme Court in the Girard
case" and render it vulnerable to an attack based on state action in vio-
lation of the equal protection provision of the fourteenth amendment.
The present attitude of the Colorado Supreme Court is apparently fa-
vorable to such an attack."
Judicial acceptance of the doctrine of Shelley v. Kraemer has been
slow and painful, not an immediate acclamation as predicted by the
43 In re Girard's Estate, 386 Pa. 548, 127 A.2d 287, 325 (dissenting opinion). The
petitioners contended that the Girard trust was a public charity and as such subject
to the provisions of the fourteenth amendment.
44 In re Girard's Estate, supra note 42. "If the present contention of the city is
correct, its effect will be catastrophic on testamentary church and charitable bequests,
as well as on the law of wills in Pennsylvania-the Fourteenth Amendment-is not
confined to color; it prohibits states from making any discrimination because of race,
creed or color. It follows logically and necessarily that if an individual cannot con-
stitutionally leave his money to an orphanage or to a private home or college for
poor white male orphans, he cannot constitutionally leave his money to a Catholic,
or Episcopal, or Baptist, or Methodist, or Lutheran or Presbyterian Church; or to a
Synagogue for Orthodox Jews; or to a named Catholic Church or to a named Catholic
priest for Masses for the repose of his soul, or for other religious or charitable pur-
poses. That would shock the people of Pennsylvania and the people of the United
States more than a terrible earthquake or a large atomic bomb."
45 But see Gordon v. Gordon. 332 Mass. 197, 124 N.E.2d 229 (1955), cert. denied,
349 U.S. 947 (1955). Judicial enforcement of a will which revoked a gift to any child
who should marry a person not born in the Jewish faith did not contravene the first
or fourteenth amendments because it did not establish a condition based on belief
at the time of marriage. Shelley v. Kraemer and Brown v. Board of Education were
distinguished.
46 Clayton v. Hallett, 30 Colo. 231, 234, 70 Pac. 429 (1902).
47 Estate of Clayton, City and County of Denver, Trustee v. Park Hill Golf Club,
127 Colo. 592, 259 P.2d 617 (1953).
48 Pennsylvania v. Board of Directors of City Trusts, 353 U.S. 230 (1957).
49 See Capitol Federal Savings and Loan Assn. v. Smith, 316 P.2d 252 (1957).
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writers. However, the trend seems to be toward broadening the rule to
prohibit state action in any form from aiding private discrimination."
The Colorado court has taken the lead in adopting the broad doc-
trine of Shelley v. Kraemer and it is probable that other states will fol-
low suit as the cases arise. The judicial climate seems favorable to such
development in view of recent pronouncements of the United States Su-
preme Court in other areas involving equal protection under the four-
teenth amendment. 51
50 Cf. Pritchett, Civil Liberties and the Vinson Court, 145. "All in all, the liberal
record of the Vinson Court in racial discrimination cases stands out in sharp con-
trast to the generally antilibertarian trend of its decisions in other fields. Moreover,
a comparison of the 1948 and 1953 restrictive covenant decisions . . . reveals a progres-
sively developing boldness in the handling of discrimination issues."
51 See Pennsylvania v. Board of Directors of City Trusts, 353 U.S. 230 (1957);
Brown v. Board of Educaton, 347 U.S. 483 (1953).
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